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The End of Mandatory 
Securities Arbitration? 
 
Jill I. Gross
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Mandatory arbitration is under attack in the United States.  In recent 
years, academics, media commentators, and consumer advocates have 
lamented the alleged evils of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesive 
consumer and employment agreements.  They decry oppressive clauses 
such as class action waivers, inconvenient venue selection, cost-shifting 
provisions, and process limitations, all foisted upon those with inferior 
bargaining power.
1
  While some judges have applied common law 
contract doctrines to strike down these clauses as unconscionable,
2
 
 
   

     Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills and Director, Pace Investor Rights 
Clinic (“PIRC”), Pace University School of Law.  I am deeply indebted to Edward 
Pekarek, Clinical Law Fellow and Staff Attorney, PIRC, for his editing suggestions.  As 
always, thanks to Professor Barbara Black for her willingness to explore securities 
arbitration with me over the past eleven years. 
1. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in 
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Mark E. 
Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 133 (2004); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 
64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big 
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It 
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: 
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 
637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).  But see Stephen J. Ware, The 
Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular Consideration of 
Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 264 (2006) (arguing against 
legislation prohibiting enforcement of adhesive predispute arbitration agreements and 
stating that “the general enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society 
as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most consumers, 
employees and other adhering parties”). 
2. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
class-arbitration waiver in parties‟ consumer credit-card agreement was unconscionable); 
In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing grant of motion 
to compel arbitration where arbitration agreement contained mandatory class action 
waiver clause). 
1
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illusory,
3
 or violative of the contract‟s implied covenant of good faith 
and fear dealing,
4
 courts typically enforce the clauses pursuant to section 
two of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which declares irrevocable 
and enforceable written arbitration provisions in all maritime transactions 
and contracts “involving commerce.”5  Routine enforcement stems from 
the United States Supreme Court‟s mandate that courts ruling on 
arbitrability questions must apply a presumption of arbitrability.
6
 
In the early 2000s, legislators attempted reform, introducing a 
variety of bills into Congress to ameliorate the impact of FAA section 
two on adhesive consumer arbitration agreements, but these bills did not 
emerge from the committee process to become law.
7
  Most recently, both 
the Senate and the House introduced nearly identical bills to enact the 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (“AFA”).8  Section two of the AFA 
consists of “findings” that reflect, in their totality, Congress‟ disdain for 
today‟s consumer, employment, and franchise arbitration that results 
from arbitration clauses in adhesive contracts, which it views as 
oppressive of consumer, employee, and franchisee rights, respectively.  
In these proposed “findings,” Congress declares that the FAA “was 
intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally 
similar sophistication and bargaining power,”9 but that a “series of 
United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of the 
[FAA] so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly 
disparate economic power.”10  The “findings” further state that “[m]ost 
consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to 
submit their claims to arbitration,”11 a process that “undermines the 
development of public law for civil rights and consumer rights because 
there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators‟ decisions,”12 and is 
a “poor system for protecting [those] rights because it is not 
transparent.”13 
 
3. See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan‟s Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001). 
4. See, e.g., Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
6. See Moses H. Cone Mem‟l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
7. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 
3010, 110th Cong. (2007). 
8. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
9. S. 931 § 2(1). 
10. Id. § 2(2). 
11. Id. § 2(3). 
12. Id. § 2(5). 
13. Id. § 2(6). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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The AFA, if passed by Congress, would amend the FAA to 
invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements (“PDAAs”) that require 
arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, or civil rights 
dispute.
14
  Each of these disputes is defined quite broadly, so as to ensure 
maximum invalidation of mandatory arbitration.  The AFA also provides 
that courts, not arbitrators, decide all questions as to the “validity and 
enforceability of an [arbitration] agreement . . . irrespective of whether 
the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement 
specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing 
such agreement.”15  This language reverses the Supreme Court‟s 
“separability” doctrine, which permits arbitrators to rule on a claim that a 
contract is not valid even though the allegedly invalid contract is the 
source of the arbitration clause.
16
  It also codifies the Supreme Court 
holding that courts decide questions of arbitrability while simultaneously 
strengthening it by apparently eliminating the exception that arbitrators 
can decide if the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended the 
arbitrators to decide arbitrability.
17
 
Academic reaction to the AFA has been mixed.
18
  Some deem the 
2009 AFA an overreaching legislative solution to the problem of 
mandatory consumer and employment arbitration.
19
  Others laud it as 
welcomed reform.
20
 
In this essay, I put aside the important debate over the AFA with 
respect to all forms of arbitration except one: securities arbitration.
21
  
 
14. Id. § 402(a). 
15. Id. § 402(b)(1). 
16. Id.  The “separability” doctrine stems from Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), in which the Supreme Court held that arbitrators 
can decide a claim of fraudulent inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause 
because the allegation of fraud was directed at the contract itself and not at the arbitration 
clause. 
17. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
18. This academic reaction may also be moot, as the legislation does not appear 
headed for passage, at least as of the summer of 2010. 
19. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of 
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395 (2009); Peter B. Rutledge, The Case 
Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4.  See also 
Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL‟Y 549 (2008). 
20. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness 
Act, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151 (2009) (arguing the Act is needed to correct the 
separation of powers violations by adhesive arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Fixing the 
Mandatory Arbitration Problem: We Need the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 16 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 5. 
21. My focus on securities arbitration stems from my long-standing scholarly and 
clinical interest in the process.  Since 1999, I have been a Director of the Investor Rights 
3
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“Securities arbitration” broadly refers to arbitration of disputes between 
investors (customers) and their individual brokers and broker-dealer 
firms, employment disputes between individual brokers and their 
employer firms, and intra-industry disputes among securities industry 
parties.  Today, these disputes are arbitrated at FINRA Dispute 
Resolution.
22
 
In the early 2000s, due, in part, to the intensifying scrutiny of 
adhesive consumer and employment arbitration, investors raised anew 
their contentions, largely silenced since the late 1980s by the Supreme 
Court,
23
 that mandatory arbitration of customer disputes—the first 
category of securities arbitration mentioned above—was unfair.  In 
response, the Senate version of the 2009 AFA expressly extended its 
coverage to securities industry disputes through its definition of 
“consumer dispute.”  Thus, the proposed Act defines “consumer dispute” 
as: 
 
 
Clinic (f/k/a Securities Arbitration Clinic) at Pace Law School, in which law students, 
under faculty supervision, represent individual investors of modest means in their 
arbitrable securities disputes.  My scholarship has focused on assessing the fairness of 
securities arbitration.  I have been a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) 
arbitrator for almost ten years, and just completed four years of service as a public 
member of the National Arbitration and Mediation Committee of FINRA. 
22. Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”) 
and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) ran separate arbitration forums that 
handled a combined 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country.  On July 30, 2007, 
NASD and NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated 
and formed FINRA.  See Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation 
Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (July 30, 2007), available 
at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329.  FINRA now operates 
the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry.  See FINRA, What is 
Dispute Resolution?, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/ 
Overview/ (last visited July 25, 2010). 
23. In the late 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled prior law, Wilko v. Swan, 
346 U.S. 427 (1953), and held that brokerage firms could enforce PDAAs in brokerage 
account customer agreements as to federal securities law claims.  See Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (holding that claims 
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding that claims arising under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable).  Several subsequent landmark arbitration law 
opinions issued by the Supreme Court arose from NASD/FINRA arbitrations.  See, e.g., 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (holding that NASD 
arbitrators, not courts, decide the application of NASD forum‟s eligibility rule); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding that NASD 
arbitrators have power to award punitive damages); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (holding broker‟s claim arising under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act is arbitrable before NASD). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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a dispute between a person other than an organization 
who seeks or acquires real or personal property, services 
(including services relating to securities and other 
investments), money, or credit for personal, family, or 
household purposes and the seller or provider of such 
property, services, money or credit.
24
 
 
However, Congress‟ 2010 legislative agenda placed the AFA on the 
backburner as it focused on financial services regulatory reform, among 
other legislative priorities.  Instead, the politically-charged clamor for 
stronger regulation of the financial services industry culminated in the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”).25  As part of that massive reform bill, a provision in 
Dodd-Frank empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) to prohibit PDAAs in customer agreements.  Should it? 
This essay argues that, because securities arbitration is markedly 
different from other forms of consumer arbitration, the SEC should not 
exercise its new power to ban PDAAs in securities customer account 
agreements, nor should Congress, if it passes the AFA, extend it to 
encompass arbitration of securities customer disputes.  The first part of 
this essay briefly chronicles the current debate over the fairness of 
securities arbitration.  Next, I argue that FINRA arbitration—whose 
fairness is regulated with substantial oversight by the SEC
26—does not 
suffer from the same features and flaws that critics of arbitration in other 
forums have excoriated as oppressively unfair.  In this part, I also argue 
that eliminating mandatory securities arbitration would have significant 
adverse consequences for investors and for the vitality of the dispute 
resolution mechanism.  The essay concludes by asserting that regulators 
should not enact arbitration reform that needlessly and without 
foundation brands securities arbitration as the evil twin of adhesive 
 
24. S. 931, 111th Cong. § 401(2) (1st Sess. 2009).  The House version defines 
“consumer dispute” as “a dispute between a person other than an organization who seeks 
or acquires real or personal property, services, money, or credit for personal, family, or 
household purposes and the seller or provider of such property, services, money, or 
credit.”  H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 3(6)(4) (1st Sess. 2009).  If Congress takes further 
action on the AFA, the House is expected to conform its version with the Senate‟s 
extension during the committee process. 
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
26. For a detailed discussion of the nature and statutory authority for this oversight, 
see Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 512-17 (2008). 
5
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consumer arbitration. 
 
II.  The Recent Debate over the Fairness of Securities Arbitration 
 
For more than twenty years, arbitration in forums sponsored by the 
securities industry has been the primary mechanism
27
 for the resolution 
of disputes among investors, brokerage firms and brokers.  Brokerage 
customers who allege, for example, that their broker recommended 
unsuitable investments or strategies, placed unauthorized trades or 
committed fraud
28
 must, because of the arbitration clause in their 
customer agreements, arbitrate those claims in the FINRA arbitration 
forum.  Moreover, even if the customer agreement does not contain a 
pre-dispute arbitration clause, FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for 
Customer Disputes Rule 12200 requires broker-dealers and their 
associated persons to submit to arbitration upon the demand of a 
customer. 
As a result of the virtually mandatory and ubiquitous nature of the 
process to resolve disputes between investors and their brokers,
29
 
participants have debated its fairness despite numerous improvements 
over the years.  Many investor advocates argue that securities arbitration 
is unfair, inefficient, expensive, and biased towards the securities 
industry.
30
  The securities industry, on the other hand, contends that the 
arbitration process works well, is faster and less expensive than 
litigation, and is fair to all the parties involved.
31
  Since 2007, the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), the 
trade association for the securities industry, has engaged in substantial 
 
27. Mediation is also utilized if all parties consent.  See Jill I. Gross, Securities 
Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
329, 359 (2006). 
28. For a description of the most common claims brought by customers against 
their brokers, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The 
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1008-12 (2002). 
29. N. AM. SEC. ADM‟RS ASS‟N (“NASAA”), MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION: 
IS IT FAIR AND VOLUNTARY? 1 (2009). 
30. See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Subcommittee 
Hearing] (statement of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (“PIABA”) in 
Connection With the Subcommittee‟s Review of the arbitration system); Mark A. Tepper, 
Survey Says—SRO Arbitration Unfair, 12 PIABA BAR J. 11 (2005). 
31. See FIN. SERVS. INST., THE EFFICACY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION AND 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (2010) (concluding that FINRA arbitrations are more cost-
effective and resolve more quickly than litigation).  The Financial Services Institute is an 
advocacy organization for Independent Broker-Dealers. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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lobbying efforts to persuade Congress not to extend the AFA to the 
securities industry, including the release of a White Paper arguing that 
securities arbitration is fair to investors.
32
  As with mandatory consumer 
arbitration, scholars are divided.
33
 
The U.S. Congress also has examined securities arbitration in recent 
years.  In March 2005, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee held a hearing to better understand how 
the securities arbitration process was working and whether reforms were 
needed.
34
  At that hearing, witnesses with expertise in securities 
arbitration testified about, and disagreed on the ramifications of, many 
aspects of the process, including: (1) its mandatory nature,
35
 (2) the 
inclusion of one industry arbitrator on every three-arbitrator panel,
36
 and 
 
32. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS‟N, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY (2007), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/arbitration-white-paper.pdf [hereinafter SIFMA 
WHITE PAPER].  SIFMA “brings together the shared interests of hundreds of securities 
firms, banks and asset managers.”  SIFMA, The SIFMA Organization, 
http://www.sifma.org/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). 
33. Compare Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE 
L. REV. 1 (2004) (concluding that the process is fair), with Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. 
Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 459 (2008) 
(arguing that securities arbitration is not fair).  See also Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street 
Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
123 (2005). 
34. See The Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 109th Cong. 13-14 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Hearing]. 
35. Id.  To open an account with virtually any broker-dealer, investors must sign an 
agreement that contains a clause requiring them to settle any disputes in arbitration.  This 
clause is regulated, both in form and content, by FINRA Rules.  See NASD CONDUCT R. 
3110(f), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/InterpretiveLetters/ConductRules. 
36. At FINRA, if the claim is more than $100,000, the arbitration panel generally 
consists of three arbitrators.  FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER 
DISPUTES R. 12401(c) (2009), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4096 
[hereinafter CUSTOMER CODE].  A three-person arbitration panel consists of one non-
public arbitrator, customarily referred to as an industry arbitrator, and two public 
arbitrators, or arbitrators who are not associated with the securities or commodities 
industry.  CUSTOMER CODE R. 12402(b).  Industry arbitrators include individuals who 
have been associated within the past five years with, or who are retired from, the 
securities or commodities industry, as well as professionals who have devoted at least 
twenty percent of their professional work in the past two years to clients in the securities 
and commodities industry.  CUSTOMER CODE R. 12100(p).  Investor advocates contend 
that “the industry arbitrator presents an appearance of bias and impropriety to the 
investing public,” 2005 Hearing, supra note 34, at 105 (statement of PIABA), while the 
securities industry asserts that industry arbitrators provide valuable expertise.  SIFMA 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 36. 
7
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(3) a lack of transparency in arbitrators‟ decisions.37  In 2007, Senators 
Russell D. Feingold and Patrick Leahy urged SEC Chairman Christopher 
Cox to enact a rule banning mandatory arbitration clauses from broker-
dealers‟ customer agreements.38  Shortly afterwards, Senate and House 
subcommittees held hearings on the proposed AFA of 2007
39—with an 
identical bill introduced in each chamber—and a critic of the current 
securities arbitration process testified at each of them.
40 
 Senator 
Feingold, sponsor of the Senate bill, expressly stated that the Act would 
apply to PDAAs in securities brokerage customer account agreements.
41
  
The 2007 AFA never emerged from committee, and so, early during the 
2009-10 Congressional session, each chamber of Congress introduced 
the 2009 version of the AFA. 
In the fall of 2009, the AFA stalled in Congress due to more 
pressing legislative priorities, including bail-outs of automakers, banks, 
and insurance companies.  But policy-makers were still concerned about 
the fairness of securities arbitration.  With pressure mounting for 
regulatory reform of the financial services industry, the Treasury 
Department released a blueprint for this reform.
42
  Buried near the end of 
more than eighty pages of policy positions and proposals to avoid a 
repeat of the systemic failures that caused the 2008 credit crisis was the 
recommendation that “[t]he SEC should study the use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in investor contracts.”43  The body of the 
 
37. FINRA publishes all arbitration awards on its website and, during the arbitrator-
selection process, provides information on an arbitrator‟s past awards.  However, FINRA 
does not require its arbitrators to explain awards or their reasoning, unless all parties 
jointly request an explained award.  See CUSTOMER CODE R. 12904. 
38. Letter from Russell D. Feingold, Senator, & Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (May 4, 
2007) (on file with author).  See also Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.C., Reconsider 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 3, at 1. 
39. See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 30; Hearing on “H.R. 3010, The 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007” before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearing]. 
40. See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 30, at 13 (statement of Tanya 
Solov, representing NASAA); House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 113 
(statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein, Testimony in Support of Prohibiting Mandatory 
Arbitration in Securities Cases). 
41. Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 30 (opening statement of Sen. 
Feingold).  “First, [the Act] is intended to cover disputes between investors and securities 
brokers.  I believe that such disputes are covered by the definition of consumer disputes, 
but to clear up any uncertainty, we will make the intent even clearer when we mark up 
the bill in committee.”  Id. 
42. DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009). 
43. Id. at 72. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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recommendation stated: 
 
Broker-dealers generally require their customers to 
contract at account opening to arbitrate all disputes.  
Although arbitration may be a reasonable option for 
many consumers to accept after a dispute arises, 
mandating a particular venue and up-front method of 
adjudicating disputes—and eliminating access to 
courts—may unjustifiably undermine investor interests.  
We recommend legislation that would give the SEC clear 
authority to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in 
broker-dealer and investment advisory accounts with 
retail customers.  The legislation should also provide 
that, before using such authority, the SEC would need to 
conduct a study on the use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses in these contracts.  The study shall consider 
whether investors are harmed by being unable to obtain 
effective redress of legitimate grievances, as well as 
whether changes to arbitration are appropriate.
44
 
 
This proposal—to empower the SEC to prohibit mandatory PDAAs 
in customer agreements, if, after studying the impact of mandatory 
securities arbitration on investors, it concludes it would serve the 
interests of investor protection—appeared in Dodd-Frank, the financial 
services regulatory reform bill that President Obama signed into law on 
July 21, 2010.  Thus, section 921 of Dodd-Frank, provides: 
 
The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that 
require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or 
municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute 
between them arising under the Federal securities laws, 
the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a 
self-regulatory organization if it finds that such 
prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limitations are 
in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
45
 
 
44. Id. (emphasis added). 
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 921(a) (2d Sess. 2010).  The original House of Representatives version of 
the Act, in section 7202, would also have required the Comptroller General of the United 
States to: 
9
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Unlike the Senate version of the AFA, which, if enacted, would 
represent an exercise of Congressional power for the express purpose of 
banning mandatory securities arbitration,
46
 Dodd-Frank delegates to the 
SEC the task of deciding whether the “the public interest” and “the 
protection of investors” requires it to ban arbitration clauses in customer 
agreements, and expressly authorizes the SEC to enact such a rule 
change.  Thus, Dodd-Frank appears to obviate the need for the AFA to 
encompass securities arbitration.
47
  Rather, Congress has chosen the 
route of delegating power to an administrative agency to regulate 
securities arbitration.
48
 
Why did Congress choose to delegate the power to ban PDAAs to 
the SEC rather than ban them outright?  It could just be a politically 
palatable compromise: legislators answered the investors‟ lobby call for 
reform but did not run afoul of Wall Street‟s strong desire to preserve 
arbitration as the primary dispute resolution mechanism for customer 
disputes.  Congress simply punted to the SEC to address the issue. 
Another, more likely answer is that, in 1975, Congress amended the 
federal securities laws to empower the SEC to oversee self-regulatory 
 
 
conduct a study to review—(1) the costs to parties of an arbitration 
proceeding using the arbitration system operated by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority and overseen by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as compared to litigation; (2) the percentage 
of recovery of the total amount of a claim in an arbitration proceeding 
using the arbitration system operated by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority and overseen by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; and (3) other additional issues as may be raised during 
the course of the study conducted under this subsection. 
 
This provision mandating a Comptroller General study did not survive the conference 
committee mark-ups. 
46. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text. 
47. Dodd-Frank may obviate the need for the AFA altogether, at least with respect 
to consumer disputes, as the new law creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
empowered to, among other things, prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer 
financial products and services contracts.  H.R. 4173 §§ 1011, 1028. 
48. This delegation also might explain why section 921 of Dodd-Frank, by its 
terms, applies only to arbitration of federal securities law claims, and not state law claims 
as well.  If the SEC ultimately exercises its new power to ban PDAAs in customer 
agreements, it could exclude PDAAs with respect to state law claims, returning the 
industry to the pre-McMahon bifurcation of federal and state claims.  See Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding that, when a complaint raises both 
federal securities law and pendent state law claims, district court must compel arbitration 
of state law claims and retain jurisdiction over federal statutory claims). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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organization (“SRO”) rule-making, including SRO arbitration.49  As a 
result, the SEC has been in the business of examining the fairness of 
securities arbitration for the past thirty-five years.  Congress might not 
have wanted to usurp a function for which the SEC has far more 
experience and expertise. 
Yet, even under this view, a legislative enactment was necessary, 
because the SEC has taken the position that it did not have the power to 
ban PDAAs in customer agreements before this express legislative 
authorization.  This position stems from the Supreme Court‟s seminal 
decisions in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon
50
 and Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
51
 which held that claims 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act 
of 1933, respectively, are arbitrable.  Those decisions also reiterated the 
Court‟s previous holding that FAA § 2‟s declaration that PDAAs are 
irrevocable and enforceable could only be trumped by clear evidence that 
Congress did not intend those statutory rights to be arbitrable.
52
  The 
Court concluded that provisions in those Acts that declare void “[a]ny 
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive 
compliance with any provision of [the Act]” did not constitute clear 
Congressional intent to ban arbitration of claims arising under these 
Acts.
53
  Since Congress has not amended the federal securities laws to 
add any other clear evidence since those decisions, the SEC reasons, any 
regulation it adopted banning PDAAs in customer agreements would 
exceed its statutory authority.  In other words, unless Congress tells the 
SEC it has the explicit authority to ban PDAAs in customer agreements, 
the SEC will not ban them, even if it concludes that doing so would 
further its investor protection mission. 
While SEC studies of the FINRA arbitration process and any 
resulting rule-making will take time, it is not inconceivable that the 
mandatory securities arbitration regime as we know it today will cease to 
exist in the not-too-distant future.  In the next section of this essay, I 
 
49. The SEC has oversight authority over SRO securities arbitration pursuant to 
section 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the „34 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 
78s(b) (2006), which requires SEC approval of any changes to the SRO securities 
arbitration rules.  The SEC is required to find that any proposed change is “consistent 
with the requirements of [the „34 Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder,” 
including the requirement that the rule protect investors and be in the public interest.  Id. 
§ 78s(b)(2). 
50. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
51. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
52. See id. at 483; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27. 
53. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 482-83; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-28. 
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examine whether the SEC should tinker with this regime. 
 
III.  The SEC Should Not Ban Mandatory Securities Arbitration 
 
Although Congress has now provided the requisite authority to the 
SEC to ban mandatory arbitration (or, as some legislators think, 
Congress has that authority directly), I do not believe the SEC or 
Congress should exercise that authority.  In 2008, I argued that securities 
arbitration, which takes place primarily in FINRA‟s dispute resolution 
forum, is fair to investors, when measured against hallmarks of 
procedural fairness.
54
  I based my assessment on an analysis of the rules 
and practices of the forum and my own experiences with the process, not 
only as an arbitrator, but also as a lawyer who has represented both 
claimants and respondents in customer and intra-industry disputes. 
On the other hand, empirical research shows that investors perceive 
that securities arbitration is unfair.
55
  In 2006-08, Professor Barbara 
Black of the University of Cincinnati College of Law and I conducted a 
mailed survey of participants‟ perceptions of fairness in recent securities 
arbitrations.
56
  Our survey results demonstrated that: “(1) investors have 
a far more negative perception of securities arbitration than all other 
participants, (2) investors have a strong negative perception of the bias of 
arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum, and (3) investors lack 
knowledge of the securities arbitration process.”57  While we contended 
that, at least in part, factors other than the substantive fairness of the 
forum are responsible for investors‟ negative perceptions of FINRA 
arbitration,
58
 we acknowledged that the survey‟s results clearly called for 
some type of reform.
59
  I do not, however, believe that a blanket ban on 
 
54. See Gross, supra note 26, at 518. 
55. Jill Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical 
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 
349 (2008). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 354. 
58. Id. at 391-99. 
59. In fact, in direct response to the survey results, FINRA enacted several reforms 
of its arbitration procedures, including requiring arbitrators to write an “explained 
decision” if all parties request it, see Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to 
Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure To Require Arbitrators To Provide an 
Explained Decision Upon the Joint Request of the Parties, 74 Fed. Reg. 6928-29 (Feb. 
11, 2009) (citing survey results as one catalyst for the revised rule change proposal), and 
introducing the Public Arbitrator Pilot Program to give customers the option of having 
their dispute decided by an all-public panel.  See FINRA Dispute Resolution, Public 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/5
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mandatory arbitration is the answer.  As Professor Black and I wrote: 
 
As longtime observers of securities arbitration, we 
continue to believe that it is a better alternative to 
litigation.  Nevertheless, the survey‟s findings are 
troublesome.  Despite FINRA‟s commendable efforts to 
improve the process, these efforts will likely prove 
unsuccessful in winning customers‟ confidence so long 
as they are required to accept both an industry arbitrator 
and an unexplained award. . . . [I]n light of these 
findings of customers‟ dissatisfaction and perceptions of 
unfairness, the indisputable reality is that it is incumbent 
upon regulators, the forum, and the industry to work 
toward further improvements in the system.  We believe 
that these suggested reforms [eliminating the industry 
arbitrator and requiring explained awards upon any 
party‟s request] may help to improve investors‟ 
perceptions and obviate the need for Congressional 
action.
60
 
 
Because I believe that any flaws in the system can be reformed from 
within, I believe the SEC should not prohibit pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in customer agreements with their securities brokerage firms nor 
should the AFA, if ever enacted, cover securities disputes.  Securities 
arbitration is vastly different from the consumer arbitration that the AFA 
is designed to remedy for many important reasons.  First, the SEC 
robustly exercises its extensive authority to oversee the primary 
securities SRO, FINRA, including its dispute resolution arm.
61
  This SEC 
oversight is designed to ensure that FINRA‟s rules, including its Code of 
Arbitration Procedure, are fair and protect investors.  By contrast, no 
administrative agency reviews the rules, procedures or protocols of 
consumer or non-securities employment arbitration forums.  In that 
context, no oversight agency exists to mandate reform if party 
participants perceive substantive injustices or procedural deficiencies. 
 
Arbitrator Pilot Program Frequently Asked Questions,  
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/ArbitrationProcess/NoticesToParties/P
116995 (last visited March 13, 2010). 
60. Gross & Black, supra note 55, at 400-01. 
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  See also Gross, supra note 26, at 
512-17. 
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Second, FINRA Conduct Rule 3110(f) prescribes language that 
member firms must include in their customer agreements, if they include 
a PDAA, which discloses to customers that the agreement contains an 
arbitration clause and that they are relinquishing rights by signing the 
agreement.  The Rule also precludes brokerage firms from including 
unfair provisions, or provisions that limit a customer‟s rights and 
remedies, in investor PDAAs, thus promoting fairness for the investor-
claimant.
62
  Thus, for example, unlike adhesive class action waivers that 
appear routinely in consumer arbitration clauses, FINRA bars brokerage 
firms from imposing class action waivers in their PDAAs, and FINRA 
Dispute Resolution does not permit class arbitrations, thus freeing 
investors to pursue class action claims in court.
63
 
Third, FINRA‟s Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes (“Customer Code”) contains provisions that expressly 
contradict the types of unfair consumer arbitration provisions that the 
AFA targets, including required notice of the claim,
64
 an opportunity to 
be heard,
65
 a right to be represented,
66
 a hearing location convenient for 
the customer,
67
 and decision by neutral arbitrator(s).
68
  The Customer 
Code permits extensive document discovery while discouraging time-
consuming and costly depositions.
69
  It also explicitly empowers 
arbitrators to impose sanctions on any party for discovery 
intransigence.
70
  The Code also stringently limits costly and potentially 
forum-prohibitive dispositive motions.
71
 
 
62. NASD CONDUCT R. 3110(f)(4) provides: 
 
No predispute arbitration agreement shall include any condition that: 
(A) limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization; 
(B) limits the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration; 
(C) limits the ability of a party to file any claim in court permitted to 
be filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim may 
be filed under the agreement; 
(D) limits the ability of arbitrators to make any award. 
 
63. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12204. 
64. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12300, 12301. 
65. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12600. 
66. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12208. 
67. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12213. 
68. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12400, 12408, 12414. 
69. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12505-12513. 
  70.   CUSTOMER CODE R. 12511. 
71. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12504. 
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Fourth, FINRA Dispute Resolution facilitates forum access to 
investors.  FINRA subsidizes forum fees by charging securities industry 
parties a greater percentage of its costs than investors, rendering 
investors‟ costs to pursue securities arbitration substantially lower 
relative to consumer arbitration.
72
  The Customer Code provides for the 
waiver of filing fees upon ample demonstration of financial hardship.
73
  
It provides liberal rules for representation by attorneys and non-
attorneys.
74
  It assists pro se investors with their filings and supports law 
school clinics to fill gaps in representation.
75
  It designates a convenient 
hearing location based on the customer‟s residence, not on the brokerage 
firm‟s place of business.76  It permits direct communication between 
parties and arbitrators to reduce costs and increase efficiencies.
77
  
Finally, it provides a special, expedited procedure for default 
proceedings against a member firm whose membership privileges have 
been terminated, suspended, canceled, or otherwise defunct, or against an 
associated person whose registration is terminated, revoked or 
suspended.
78
 
Fifth, FINRA Dispute Resolution actively promotes transparency of 
the arbitration process.  Its user-friendly website is replete with guides, 
resources and links to materials that are helpful to users of the forum—
both parties and their representatives.
79
  To enhance arbitrator 
accountability, it recently amended its rules to require arbitrators to write 
an explained decision, if all parties jointly request one.
80
  It regularly 
tracks and publishes statistics regarding the speed of resolution and the 
 
72. See Rick Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA, Testimony Before the 
Committee on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (Oct. 6, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Ketchum/P120108) (stating that “FINRA-
registered firms pay for most arbitration costs and FINRA waives fees for individuals 
experiencing financial hardship.”).  See also CUSTOMER CODE R. 12901. 
73. See Ketchum, supra note 72.  See also CUSTOMER CODE R. 12901, 12900(a)(1). 
74. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12208. 
75. In particular, the forum lists resources for unrepresented parties to help them 
find a lawyer able to represent them.  See FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation, How to 
Find an Attorney (2010), 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/HowToFindAnAttorney 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
76. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12213. 
77. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12211. 
78. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12801. 
79. See FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation, Resources for Parties, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/ (last visited July 26, 2010). 
80. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12904(g).  For a discussion of the pros and cons of 
explained awards in arbitration, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, The Explained Award 
of Damocles: Protection or Peril in Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006). 
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outcomes of customer cases. 
Sixth, FINRA ensures that, if an arbitration panel awards damages, 
the investor will collect those damages promptly as long as the losing 
party or parties have assets.  The Customer Code mandates that “[a]ll 
monetary awards shall be paid within 30 days of receipt unless a motion 
to vacate has been filed with a court of competent jurisdiction.”81  This 
power sharply deters any industry-related party from stalling or resisting 
payment of an award.  Statistics show that customers win an award of 
damages in roughly forty percent of cases that proceed to a hearing.
82
  
Collection agencies are rarely needed for investors to obtain their 
awards, in part because FINRA retains the power to suspend or revoke 
the license of any broker-dealer that does not pay an award within thirty 
days.
83
  In sum, the features of FINRA Dispute Resolution‟s arbitration 
process distinguish it from many of the forums that regularly hear 
consumer disputes and render it more fair. 
Supporters of the ban on mandatory securities arbitration contend 
that these many distinguishing characteristics still do not justify 
depriving investors of choice.  Under the regime these advocates seek, if 
investors want arbitration, they can choose it post-dispute under 
Customer Code 12200, which permits customers to demand that a 
FINRA member firm and/or associated person of that firm arbitrate 
disputes arising “in connection with the business activities of the member 
or the associated person.”84  If investors do not want to arbitrate a 
particular dispute, a member firm or associated person could not compel 
it.  As an investor advocate, I have difficulty arguing against enhanced 
investor choice. 
Yet numerous factors persuade me that this legislated regime would 
ultimately not benefit investors.  First, investors‟ claims would face a far 
more hostile environment in court, as the rule of law, particularly in 
federal court, is far more anti-investor than the equitable principles that 
 
  81.  CUSTOMER CODE R. 12904(j). 
82. See FINRA, Summary Arbitration Statistics January 2010, available at 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm 
(including historical data for results of customer claimant arbitration award from 2005 
through January 2010). 
83. See FINRA BY-LAWS, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 3(b), SUSPENSION OR 
CANCELLATION (2007), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4625.  
See also CUSTOMER CODE R. 12904; NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 00-55, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p00399
3.pdf. 
84. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12200. 
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an arbitration panel can employ to deliver justice.
85
  Instead of 
recovering some amount of damages in more than forty percent of their 
claims,
86
 investors would face significant procedural hurdles to even 
survive the pleading stage of a lawsuit, which can drag on for several 
years.  They would also have to bear the costs of extensive discovery, 
primarily depositions, which are not permitted in FINRA arbitration.  By 
contrast, mandatory securities arbitration results in substantially lower 
barriers to entry for the average investor to have a dispute decided. 
Second, eliminating mandatory securities arbitration would result in 
higher transaction costs for investors.
87
  Resolution of customer disputes 
would occur in a bifurcated fashion, as customers could pursue claims in 
both FINRA arbitration and in court.
88
  Broker-dealers would have to 
alter their business models to account for the higher costs to litigate, 
rather than arbitrate, most customer disputes.  The firms, in turn, would 
pass on those higher dispute resolution costs to investors in the form of 
higher account fees and/or commissions. 
Third, individual investors, if given the choice of submitting 
disputes to arbitration or court, might not choose rationally.  Recent 
studies demonstrate that individuals faced with choices do not often 
choose in their best interests.
89
  In fact, there is ample empirical evidence 
that investors do not even make rational investment decisions when 
given choices.
90
  Rather, they elect the path requiring the least amount of 
movement or thought (i.e., inertia).
91
  Scholars also have argued that 
 
85. See Black & Gross, supra note 28, at 1035-40. 
86. See FINRA, Summary Arbitration Statistics January 2010, supra note 82. 
87. See Yin Wilczek, Panelist Warns Investor Committee About Dropping 
Arbitration Agreements, SEC. LAW DAILY, May 18, 2010 (quoting Professor Barbara 
Black as stating that “eliminating [PDAAs] would be costly for broker-dealers” and date 
“„[t]he incentives to support arbitration changes when the system becomes voluntary‟”).  
Professor Ware makes the same argument regarding adhesive arbitration agreements 
generally, although he does not focus on any particular industry.  See Ware, supra note 1, 
at 254-57. 
88. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  See also Wilczek, supra note 87 
(reporting that an in-house counsel for a brokerage firm warned that “eliminating pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration agreements would cause a „dual track‟” whereby investors 
could pursue claims in both an arbitration forum and in court). 
89. See generally Alina Tugend, Too Many Choices: A Problem That Can Paralyze, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at B5 (describing numerous research studies on individuals‟ 
choice failures). 
90. Susan Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to 
Leave 401(K) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‟Y 
361, 391-94 (2002) (identifying heuristics and cognitive biases that impede investors‟ 
rational decision-making in their 401(k) plans). 
91. Id. at 376 n.76 (2002) (citing Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power 
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numerous cognitive and psychological barriers block disputants from 
choosing the most efficient or suitable dispute resolution mechanism.
92
  
Instead, they choose the “default” mechanism, which, in this case, would 
be litigation.
93
 
Recent process choices posed to customers who have filed 
arbitration demonstrate the validity of this research.  For example, 
FINRA‟s Public Arbitrator Pilot Program gives investors in eligible 
cases the right to opt into the pilot in order to gain the option to strike all 
non-public arbitrators, and thus avoid the appointment of an industry-
affiliated arbitrator in customer cases.  Theoretically, strategic and 
rational investors should opt into the program whenever eligible, as it 
only enhances their choices as to the composition of their arbitration 
panels in three-arbitrator cases.  Yet, through December 31, 2009, barely 
half of investors (fifty-four percent) opted into the program.
94
  And, in 
those cases, less than half (forty-nine percent) struck all proposed non-
public arbitrators.
95
  Thus, giving investors the choice of dispute 
resolution mechanisms under the proposed regime might not lead to 
rational decision-making and might not maximize investors‟ interests. 
Fourth, eliminating mandatory securities arbitration could backfire 
and lead to the repeal of FINRA Customer Code 12200.  If broker-
dealers can no longer present their customers with adhesive arbitration 
agreements, will broker-dealers then seek to overturn SRO rules 
imposing on broker-dealers a duty to arbitrate?
96
  While the Chief 
Executive Officer of FINRA, Richard Ketchum, publicly states that 
FINRA will not seek to repeal Rule 12200,
97
 the issue is far from 
 
of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 
1149 (2001)) (finding that the vast majority of employee-participants in open 401(k) plan 
enrollment do not alter the default investment participation selected by the employer). 
92. Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with 
Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 93-111 (2005) (theorizing that psychological and cognitive biases 
result in disputants selecting litigation as the “default” dispute resolution mechanism). 
93. Id. 
94. 1 FINRA, THE NEUTRAL CORNER 7 (2010). 
95. Id. 
96. In a 2008 article, Professor Stephen Ware asked the related question of 
“whether fewer broker-dealers would present their customers with adhesive arbitration 
agreements if SRO rules stopped imposing on broker-dealers a duty to arbitrate?”  See 
Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration Different from Other Consumer and 
Employment Arbitration?, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 452 (2008). 
97. Seminar Highlights: Revisiting Mandatory Arbitration, 2009 SEC. ARBITRATION 
COMMENTATOR, no. 3 (Sec. Arbitration Commentator, Inc., Maplewood, N.J.), Apr. 2010, 
at 5 (reporting that Mr. Ketchum has “made it clear that FINRA‟s rule mandating BD 
arbitration at the demand of customers will stay, regardless of the PDAA‟s fate”). 
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resolved, as SIFMA has publicly contended that this potentially one-
sided arbitration system would be patently unfair to the securities 
industry.
98
 
If the SEC were to permit the repeal of Rule 12200, customers and 
industry parties would likely not submit to post-dispute arbitration for the 
same cases.  Once a dispute has arisen, and the parties must select the 
forum for a dispute whose details, including its strengths and 
weaknesses, are known, then customers would likely select arbitration in 
cases where the equities are on their side, and brokerage firms would 
prefer arbitration in cases where the equities are on their side.  Since the 
equities usually favor one side or the other in a particular case, then the 
two sides would rarely agree to arbitrate the same case, even if generally 
they are receptive to the possibility of arbitration.
99
 
Moreover, industry players would have good reason to decline a 
customer‟s post-dispute request for arbitration, especially for smaller 
cases.  Because litigation costs would be prohibitive for low dollar-value 
disputes, and willing practitioners would be scarce, customers would 
likely decide not to pursue the claims.  The time delays and costs of 
proceeding in court would likely discourage many customers from 
seeking relief. 
As a result, most customer disputes, particularly larger dollar value 
disputes, presumably will end up in court, and the number of customer 
arbitrations would decline precipitously.
100
  With a diminished case 
 
98. See Yin Wilczek, Crisis Caused Spike, Different Trends in Arbitration Cases, 
FINRA Official Says, THE BUREAU OF NAT‟L AFFAIRS (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://corplawcenter.bna.com/pic2/clb.nsf/id/BNAP-7ZHVEN?OpenDocument (noting 
SIFMA associate general counsel‟s argument that “„[i]t is unacceptable‟ that the choice to 
arbitrate is at the sole election of investors” and quoting him as saying that “[t]he choice 
should be given to both parties”).  Professor Ware agrees, noting that securities 
arbitration is different from employment and consumer arbitration, and contending that it 
is bad policy to have securities laws require brokerage firms to submit to arbitration upon 
demand of a customer or employee.  He points out that enforcing PDAAs in brokerage 
firm customer agreements is a preferred method of mandating arbitration because it 
preserves contractual freedom.  See Ware, supra note 96, at 457. 
99. Ware, supra note 1, at 263.  See also Seth Lipner, Should Securities Arbitration 
Be Mandatory?, FORBES.COM, June 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/lipner-
mandatory-arbitration-intelligent-investing-consumer-choice.html. 
100. One recent study found that, when FINRA changed its arbitration code to 
permit employees of FINRA member firms to opt out of their mandatory employment 
arbitration agreements with respect to statutory discrimination claims, the case volume of 
employment discrimination claims plummeted at FINRA.  See David B. Lipsky, Ronald 
L. Seeber & J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment Disputes in the Securities 
Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2010, at 12, 
59. 
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volume, FINRA would likely not have the same financial capacity to 
maintain an efficient, subsidized, and investor-friendly forum.
101
 
Finally, if arbitration in FINRA were optional, not mandatory, there 
would be far less political pressure on FINRA to ensure the fairness of 
the forum, as the contention that investors were dragged into the forum 
against their will would no longer be true.  This political pressure has 
been responsible for several procedural reforms over the past decade, 
including the advent of the Neutral List Selection System, the explained 
award,
102
 the public arbitrator pilot program, and a stricter definition of 
what constitutes a “public arbitrator.”103  Another impetus for FINRA‟s 
investor-friendly practices and procedures would be squandered. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 While Congress is unlikely to enact the AFA or any other regulation 
of securities arbitration due to other legislative priorities in 2010, 
mandatory securities arbitration may not survive if the SEC exercises its 
recent and explicitly-granted power to ban it.  It seems to be a 
fundamental and politically appealing policy to provide disputants, 
 
101. Wilczek, supra note 87 (reporting that Linda Fienberg, President of FINRA 
Dispute Resolution, “expressed concern with the „economics of running the forum‟ if 
FINRA only heard small cases”). 
102. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
103. Recent FINRA rule changes, among other things: (1) expanded the definition 
of a “non-public arbitrator” to include those who had been associated with a registered 
broker-dealer or commodities firm during the previous five years (as opposed to three 
years); (2) clarified that a non-public arbitrator—which already included those who had 
“retired” from the securities industry—also included those who spent a substantial part of 
their careers in the securities industry; (3) excluded from the definition of “public 
arbitrator” (a) anyone who has been associated with the industry for at least twenty years, 
no matter how long ago that association had ended, and (b) attorneys, accountants and 
other professionals whose firms have received at least ten percent of their annual revenue, 
in the previous two years, from securities or commodities industry clients.  The rule 
change also added to the definition of “immediate family member” (whose association 
with the securities industry is imputed to the arbitrator) parents, children, stepparents, and 
any member of the arbitrator‟s household.  See Order Granting Approval to a Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to Arbitrator Classification and Disclosure in NASD Arbitrations, 
69 Fed. Reg. 21,871 (Apr. 22, 2004).  To further ensure the neutrality of arbitrators, in 
2006 and 2008, the SEC approved additional rule changes amending the definition of 
public arbitrators to exclude from the public roster those with indirect ties to the 
securities industry.  See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 
Thereto Relating to Amendments to the Classification of Arbitrators Pursuant to Rule 
10308 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,026 (Oct. 20, 2006); 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, 
73 Fed. Reg. 15,025 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
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including investors, with unfettered access to courts to resolve their 
disputes.  In the current political climate, permitting “repeat players” 
such as securities brokerage firms with far superior monetary resources 
and bargaining power to mandate the FINRA arbitration forum through 
adhesive customer agreements appears unpalatable. 
Yet, if Congress or the SEC were to sweep securities arbitration into 
the wide net of public condemnation of consumer arbitration, it would 
unduly blemish a system of dispute resolution that, while far from 
perfect, does not suffer from the flaws of other types of consumer 
arbitration that the proposed AFA identifies and is designed to combat.  
Perhaps the system is a victim of “the grass is always greener” mentality, 
as reformists contend that court is a fairer means of resolution of 
customer disputes without seriously confronting and considering the 
drawbacks of securities litigation.  Prohibiting PDAAs could endanger 
the vitality of the securities arbitration system that has developed over 
the past three decades under extensive SEC oversight. 
Instead, as it has done for the past twenty-five years, the SEC 
should permit the specter of its regulatory oversight to gradually produce 
internal change.  Investor advocates continue to identify areas ripe for 
change, and the SEC forces FINRA Dispute Resolution to respond.  One 
thing is clear: Whether through internal reform or external policy, 
securities arbitration as we know it today will not survive much longer. 
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